ReportMigration · Mediterranean

ATLANTIC ROUTE, SAHEL, AND CANARY ISLANDS FROM CURBING DEPARTURES TO PROACTIVE MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

This Policy Paper proposes strategic and operational guidelines to strengthen the coherence of public responses to the migration dynamics linking the Sahel, West Africa, and the Canary Islands.

May 2026IEAM TEAM12 MIN READ

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executive summary

This Policy Paper proposes strategic and operational guidelines to strengthen the coherence of public responses to the migration dynamics linking the Sahel, West Africa, and the Canary Islands. It is based on discussions from a collective intelligence workshop held in Gran Canaria, which brought together institutional representatives, security forces, international organizations, humanitarian actors, civil society organizations, researchers, European and African representatives, as well as experts on migration routes, protection, organized crime, and development cooperation.

The shared assessment is clear: the Atlantic route cannot be understood or managed as a strictly maritime phenomenon, nor as a crisis exclusive to the Canary Islands, Spain, or Europe. It is the visible manifestation of a much broader regional system shaped by conflicts, insecurity, socioeconomic transformations, the aspirations of young people, family dynamics, diaspora networks, visa policies, security cooperation, informal economies, and illicit facilitation mechanisms.

The discussions emphasized that the recent decline in visible arrivals in the Canary Islands does not necessarily signify a reduction in migratory pressure. Several participants described a situation of containment, suspension, and some displacement rather than a structural transformation. Departures from certain historical departure points have been limited by the tightening of controls in Senegal and Mauritania, but the push factors persist. Routes are shifting toward more southerly areas, particularly The Gambia, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau, while some prospective migrants remain in limbo in mining, agricultural, urban, or border areas.

This reconfiguration carries a greater risk: when public policies focus exclusively on reducing visible flows, they can shift migration routes, increase travel costs, reinforce dependence on intermediaries, and heighten the vulnerability of people on the move. The experience of Niger, mentioned on several occasions, illustrates this mechanism: the criminalization of irregular migration in countries of origin and transit does not necessarily stop migration flows, but rather makes them more clandestine, less visible, and more dangerous.

The role of criminal economies and facilitation networks was one of the central themes of the workshop. The discussions highlighted a growing professionalization of certain segments of the system: reduced waiting times, the use of closed WhatsApp groups, payments in installments, increasing reliance on mobile money, the fragmentation of fuel purchases, transfers from small boats to larger vessels, differentiation between migrant profiles and facilitator profiles, as well as diversification in the nationalities, women, and minors present on certain routes. This professionalization does not always imply the existence of hierarchical criminal structures comparable to classic mafias. Rather, it reflects the rapid adaptation of a facilitation ecosystem to a more risky control environment.

The Malian case occupies a central place in this analysis. Migration from Mali cannot be reduced to an individual or economic decision. It is rooted in family, community, and historical dynamics. The deterioration of security, internal displacement, the loss of means of subsistence, difficult returns, social pressure, and poor local prospects create a situation in which leaving may seem like a rational choice, even when it is dangerous. For many young people, the choice is no longer between safety and risk, but between two uncertainties: staying with no prospects or leaving despite the danger. It is worth noting that the dynamics of conflict in Mali—with the southern regions of Kayes and Sikasso increasingly affected by GSIM operations—mean that historically traditional migration hubs are under growing pressure from the conflict.

The Policy Paper therefore advocates an integrated approach: a sustainable strategy must simultaneously reduce the profitability of criminal economies, ensure continuous protection along migration corridors, strengthen opportunities for legal and circular mobility, invest in training and employment at the local level, involve families and diasporas, specifically protect women and minors, and anticipate the unintended consequences of migration agreements. The Canary Islands can play a strategic role in this framework. Situated on the front lines of the Atlantic route, they possess valuable operational, institutional, and humanitarian experience. Their geographic and political position enables them to serve as a platform for dialogue, foresight, decentralized cooperation, and knowledge-building among Europe, Spain, and West Africa.

Strategic Messages

1. Shift from reducing visible migration flows to reducing the dangers faced by people on the move.

A decrease in arrivals does not necessarily mean a decrease in departures, migration demand, or risk. The goal is not to identify supposed “root causes,” but rather to construct a more comprehensive and holistic assessment that allows us to anticipate and mitigate the unintended effects of containment policies, and to rebuild, to the extent possible, safeguards for those who decide to leave despite everything. Indicators must incorporate interceptions, disappearances, route shifts, costs, violence, the profiles of people on the move, and cumulative vulnerabilities.

2. Target the profitability of criminal economies rather than migrants themselves.

Available evidence suggests that, to date, criminal justice approaches in Senegal and other countries have been indiscriminate, dragging low-level actors, migrants, and others with very limited ties to the facilitation ecosystem into the judicial system. The criminal justice response must, on the contrary, prioritize organizers, financial intermediaries, logistics networks, and those responsible for the most dangerous forms of facilitation, rather than focusing solely on the visible or peripheral figures involved in the crossing.

3. Build the capacity to anticipate trends by corridor.

Migration routes function as an integrated regional system. Changes in price, payment methods, departure points, profiles, digital messages, the presence of women or minors, and violence among networks must be analyzed as early warning indicators signaling transformations in the facilitation ecosystem, along with changes in the harms associated with those transformations.

4. Make regular mobility credible, accessible, and reciprocal.

Legal channels cannot be merely symbolic. Visas, circular mobility, vocational training, academic mobility, and tourism and professional mobility must be predictable, understandable, and linked to the real needs of the territories of origin and destination.

5. Rebalance migration cooperation around territorial development, protection, and trust.

Partnerships must move beyond a logic of containment. They must support local governments, regional economies, families, diasporas, training, reintegration, local governance, and the fight against corruption.

6. Strengthen the Canary Islands’ involvement in national and European migration management processes.

The Canary Islands should not be limited to the role of a receiving territory or observer. Their front-line operational and humanitarian experience must translate into a stable presence in the national and European decision-making forums where migration policy is defined: coordination mechanisms with the central government, participation in the European Union’s migration dialogues with third countries, and their representation in the forums where agreements that directly affect the Atlantic route are negotiated.